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Abstract  
The uneven cognitive phenotype in the adult outcome of Williams syndrome has led 
some researchers to make strong claims about the modularity of the brain and the 
purported genetically determined, innate specification of cognitive modules.  Such 
arguments have particularly been marshalled with respect to language.  We challenge 
this direct generalisation from adult phenotypic outcomes to genetic specification, and 
consider instead how genetic disorders provide clues to the constraints on plasticity 
that shape the outcome of development. We specifically examine behavioural studies, 
brain imaging and computational modelling of language in Williams syndrome, but 
contend that our theoretical arguments apply equally to other cognitive domains and 
other developmental disorders. While acknowledging that selective deficits in normal 
adult patients might justify claims about cognitive modularity, we question whether 
similar, seemingly selective deficits found in genetic disorders can be used to argue 
that such cognitive modules are pre-specified in infant brains. Cognitive modules are, 
in our view, the outcome of development, not its starting point.  We note that most 
work on genetic disorders ignores one vital factor: the actual process of ontogenetic 
development, and argue that it is vital to view genetic disorders as proceeding under 
different neurocomputational constraints, not as demonstrations of static modularity. 
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I. Introduction 
At times, genetic mutations give rise to atypical development from embryogenesis 
onwards. Some are inherited but others are due to purely random events. One such 
genetic disorder – Williams syndrome (WS) – is caused by the chance misalignment 
during meiosis of identical flanking regions surrounding some 25 genes on one copy 
of chromosome 7q11.23 (see Donnai & Karmiloff-Smith, 2000, for review). Because 
of its uneven cognitive phenotype in the adult outcome, WS has given rise to strong 
claims about the modularity of the human mind and the purported genetically 
determined, innate specification of such modules (Pinker, 1994, 1997, 1999; Smith, 
1999; Smith & Tsimpli, 1995). But can one generalise directly from adult phenotypic 
outcomes to genetic specification in this way? In this paper we argue against the 
simplicity of such claims and consider instead the way in which genetic disorders are 
informative about the constraints on plasticity that shape the outcome of processes of 
development. In doing so, we raise a number of crucial questions. First, can one use 
the selective deficits found in the mature, previously normally developed brain of 
adult neuropsychological patients to make claims about the cognitive modularity of 
the human brain? Second, if similar, seemingly selective deficits are also found in 
genetic disorders, can these be used to argue that such cognitive modules are 
genetically determined and pre-specified in the infant brain? We will answer in the 
affirmative to the first question, with a caveat about whether such pure deficits truly 
exist. But our response will be negative to the second question, arguing that most 
work on genetic disorders ignores one vital factor: the process of ontogenetic 
development. In particular, we submit that it is vital to view genetic disorders as 
proceeding developmentally under different neurocomputational constraints, not as 
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demonstrations of static modularity. We will illustrate our arguments with the case of 
language acquisition in Williams syndrome, although we maintain that the general 
tenets apply equally to other domains of cognition and to other developmental 
disorders. 
 
II.  Selective Deficits in Adult Neuropsychological Patients 
It is now well established that adults who had previously developed normally can, in 
the case of focal damage due to stroke or trauma, display selective behavioural 
deficits (Cappelletti, Butterworth & Kopelman, 2001;  Cipolotti, Butterworth & 
Warrington, 1995; Coltheart, 2002; Patterson, 1981;  Rapp & Caramazza, 2002; 
Shallice, 1988). The existence of such patients has led to the postulation that the brain 
is composed of modules, each dedicated to a specific kind of input processing. 
Patients with severe agrammatism may present with other aspects of cognition, 
including non-grammatical aspects of language, that seem to function normally. 
Likewise, other patients may have serious word-finding difficulties but their syntactic 
expression is fluent. This suggests that, by adulthood, specialised functions have 
become relatively localised to specific brain regions (in this case, that processing of 
grammar and word-specific knowledge relies on distinct underlying circuitry).  
However, it is important to recall that such an inference from selective deficit to 
normal structure is predicated on the assumption that impaired behaviour can be 
traced to damaged underlying circuitry and that intact behaviour can be traced to 
residual normally functioning circuitry. This assumption corresponds to the idea that 
following focal damage, the rest of the system continues to function exactly as it did 
before the brain insult, thereby giving rise to scores in the normal range. Of course, in 
attempting to establish that apparently intact functions are indeed working just as they 
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did before, the researcher is always at the mercy of the sensitivity of the measurement 
scale used. Our own work on adults with genetic disorders has demonstrated that even 
when behavioural scores fall within the normal range on standardised tasks, this does 
not necessarily entail normal underlying cognitive processes (Grice, Spratling, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Halit, Csibra, de Haan, & Johnson 2001; Karmiloff-Smith, 1997, 
1998; see also the process/achievement distinction introduced by Werner, 1937). 
Nonetheless, in the case of the previously normal adult patient and to the extent that 
genuine cases of pure dissociations of behaviour indeed exist, then those data tend to 
point to relative modularity of mind.  
 
III. Selective Deficits in Patients with Genetic Disorders 
What about selective deficits in adults with genetic disorders?  Do they suggest that 
the mind starts off with independent modules that can be selectively spared or 
impaired? First, it must be recalled that individuals with genetic disorders have not 
developed normally to adulthood and then suddenly suffered a brain insult; their 
brains have developed atypically from the outset. Yet, based on arguments from the 
adult neuropsychological model, there exist numerous claims in the literature for 
selective deficits in disorders of a genetic origin, against a background of intact or 
preserved function, often allied to claims that such selective deficits are evidence that 
cognitive modules are innate (Baron-Cohen, 1998; Leslie, 1992; Pinker, 1999; Smith, 
1999; Smith & Tsimpli, 1995; Temple, 1997). 
 
It should be noted that the terminology used here is misleading. While researchers 
frequently employ terms like “intact” and “preserved” with respect to cognitive 
functions in genetic disorders, this is not what they actually mean. The terms intact 
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and preserved imply that a pre-existing system has not been damaged. This may well 
be appropriate for adults who have suffered damage to a previously normal cognitive 
system, but there is no equivalent pre-existing state for the developmental disorder. 
When researchers deploy terms like “intact”, “preserved”, or “normal” for a genetic 
disorder, they are using shorthand, and they usually mean two things. First, they mean 
that behavioural scores on certain standardised tests fall within the normal range. But, 
second, they are proposing that the underlying cognitive processes have developed 
normally. The unfortunate prevalence of this terminological shorthand has tended to 
obscure the fact that claims about intact and impaired functions in genetic disorders 
actually constitute implicit developmental theories. 
 
More importantly, our view is that in developmental disorders, the existence of pure 
deficits alongside so-called “intact modules” can be challenged not just empirically, 
but theoretically as well. Even if selective, modular-like deficits were to exist in the 
older child and adult, we argue that modules are the result of a process of 
development, not its starting point (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). The effects of a genetic 
mutation during embryogenesis and postnatal brain growth are likely to be 
widespread across the developing system. Some domains will be more affected than 
others due to the different features of their particular problem space (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998; Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif & Thomas, 2002). It is crucial to take into account how 
development itself might alter final outcomes. For instance, a tiny impairment in 
infancy could impact differentially over developmental time, such that many domains 
are affected but some display only very subtle deficits, whereas others are much more 
obviously impaired. Some systems may develop atypically but still be able to generate 
behavioural scores that fall within the normal range on coarse standardized 
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psychological tests. Since cognitive systems tend to interact during development 
(either directly or indirectly via the environment), a cognitive system that is 
developing atypically may begin to subtly perturb the developmental trajectories of 
other systems with which it interacts, and particularly those that attempt to 
compensate for emerging behavioural impairments. The complex dynamics of 
interaction between neurocomputational constraints, the environment and ontogeny 
cannot be ignored. 
 
IV. Constraints on Plasticity 
Despite the above caveats about the interpretation of uneven cognitive profiles, it is 
important to recognise that developmental disorders can actually be very informative 
about constraints on plasticity. Plasticity is often invoked only in terms of the brain‟s 
response to hemispherectomies after epilepsy, to early or late damage and the like, as 
if plasticity were a rare developmental process.  As Wexler (1996) has put it: 
 "It is uncontroversial that the development [of Universal 
Grammar] is essentially guided by a biological, genetically 
determined program....Experience-dependent variation in 
biological structures or processes...is an exception...and is called 
'plasticity' “ 
Yet in our view, the notion of genetic determinism is misguided; plasticity is the rule, 
not the exception (see, also, Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994, for a similar argument). Indeed, 
plasticity is central to all development, normal or atypical, and explains how structure 
changes as a function of experience. But plasticity is not, of course, unconstrained. The 
initial properties of a learning system shape how change occurs following experience. 
The adult brain is in fact the sculpted result of a complex interaction between the 
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individual‟s processing of a wide variety of structured inputs and the 
neurocomputational constraints on the developing brain. A crucial goal, therefore, is to 
identify those constraints. But in identifying relatively consistent brain structures in the 
normal adult, as in the normal child, it is difficult to distinguish two possible scenarios: 
either the consistent structures emerge from consistent regularities in the environments 
to which children are exposed – what some have called “species-typical environments” 
(Johnson & Morton, 1991) – or they arise from consistent neurocomputational 
constraints that shape the course of development despite variability in the environment. 
It is here that experiments of nature may further our endeavours: some children start life 
with brains that have atypical neurocomputational constraints but they live in relatively 
normal environments, whereas other children may start out with potentially normal 
brains but from the outset grow up in very atypical environments (in utero due to drugs 
or alcohol, or in the outside world due to impoverished or violent conditions). This 
distinction has also been discussed by Cicchetti (2002). The former case is the focus of 
the present paper (for the latter – radically atypical environments – see review by 
Thomas, in press). We submit that genetic developmental disorders can indeed inform 
theories of normal development provided they are viewed as altered constraints on 
neural plasticity in a developing organism and not as illustrations of “intact” versus 
“damaged” static modules.  
 
V. Atypical Plasticity  
As mentioned above, sometimes a specific deficit arises after a focal lesion to the 
normal adult brain. However, as we shall shortly see, when a normal child suffers the 
same focal lesions as an adult but in early development, selective deficits rarely 
ensue. This is because normal processes of plasticity kick in and usually lead to 
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recovery from early insult, with no serious, lasting impairments. What about the case 
of genetic developmental disorders without focal brain damage? Why doesn‟t 
plasticity simply compensate for the genetic mutation and allow the child to recover 
function in similar ways to normal children with early focal brain damage? We 
believe this is because of the improbability that the genetic mutation merely affects a 
single, specific domain; rather, it is likely to affect plasticity itself, because genetic 
mutations can give rise to atypical neurocomputational constraints from the outset 
(Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif, & Thomas, 2002).    
 
In this article, we use one genetic disorder, Williams syndrome (WS), to illustrate 
how the atypical developmental pathways followed by this disorder may provide 
clues to the normal neurocomputational constraints on development. We focus here 
particularly on the domain of language acquisition, because it is WS language that 
several authors have embraced as the perfect illustration of an intact grammar module 
and the example of a dissociation between language and the rest of cognition (Pinker, 
1991, 1994, 1999; Smith, 1999). Where appropriate, we contrast WS with normal 
children who have experienced early brain damage and those suffering from other 
developmental disorders of genetic origin. However, prior to doing so, we provide an 
account of the WS genotype and phenotype in order to situate our subsequent 
arguments. 
 
VI.  A Specific Example: Williams Syndrome 
Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder occurring in  
approximately 1 in 20,000 live births (Morris, Demsey, Leonard, Dilts, Blackburn, 
1988). It gives rise to specific physical, behavioural and cognitive abnormalities, 
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together with structural, chemical and functional anomalies in the developing brain 
(Bellugi, Wang & Jernigan, 1994; Grice et al., 2001; Mervis, Morris, Bertrand & 
Robinson, 1999; Rae, Karmiloff-Smith, Lee, Dixon, Grant, Blamire, Thompson, 
Styles & Radda, 1998). The syndrome was initially reported by cardiologists (Beuren, 
Apitz & Harmjanz, 1962; Williams, Barratt-Boyes & Lowe, 1961), who discovered 
an association between the existence of supravalvular aortic stenosis (SVAS) and a 
characteristic facial dysmorphology, together with growth retardation and learning 
difficulties. Known as Williams syndrome in the USA and Williams-Beuren 
syndrome in Continental Europe, it was initially called Idiopathic Infantile 
Hypercalcaemia in the UK because some infants with a similar clinical description 
also presented with infantile hypercalcaemia (Black & Bonham-Carter, 1963).  
However, this turned out not to be a defining characteristic in subsequent cases, and 
so the disorder is now also referred to as Williams syndrome in the UK.   
 
A. The WS genotype 
Most cases of Williams syndrome are sporadic, although a few instances of 
concordant monozygotic twins and of parent to child transmission have been reported 
in the literature (Morris, Thomas & Greenburg, 1993; Pankau, Gosch, Simeoni, & 
Wessel, 1993). Although for some 20 years WS was diagnosed only on the basis of 
clinical criteria, the early 1990s hailed the discovery of the first genetic markers of the 
syndrome (Curran, Atkinson, Ewart, Morris, Leppert, & Keating, 1993; Ewart, 
Morris, Ensing, Loker, Moore, Leppert, & Keating, 1993a). Curran and collaborators 
pointed to an association between a disruption due to the translocation of one copy of 
the elastin gene at chromosome 7q11.23 and the existence of supravalvular aortic 
stenosis, a common feature of WS. Ewart and colleagues then confirmed that 
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hemizygosity at the elastin locus also occurred in patients with WS (Ewart, Morris, 
Atkinson, Weishan, Sternes, Spallone, Stock, Leppert, & Keating, 1993b). The elastin 
gene is expressed during the third trimester in utero and during early postnatal life. Its 
deletion leads to the production of structurally abnormal tropelastin and causes 
problems with elasticity and connective tissue in numerous parts of the organism, 
particularly the skin and arteries.  
 
The microdeletion measures some 1.5Mb and is of fairly uniform size in the majority 
of patients with WS, with the elastin gene being midway between the two breakpoints 
(Perez-Juralo, Peoples, Kaplan, Hamel & Franke, 1996). Parental origin seems to play 
no role, with deletions on the maternally and paternally inherited chromosomes 
occurring with equal frequency.  The mutational mechanism seems to lay in unequal 
meiotic recombination between chromosome 7 homologues, although 
intrachromosomal rearrangements also arise.  More recently, it has been shown that 
large repeats containing genes and pseudogenes flank the two deletion breakpoints, 
thereby lending themselves to chance misalignment (Peoples, Franke, Wang, Perez-
Jurado, Paperna, Cisco, & Franke, 2000; Robinson, Waslynka, Bernasconi, Wang, 
Clark, Kotzot, & Schinzel,  1996; Urban, Helms, Fekete, Csiszar, Bonnet, Munnich, 
Donis-Keller & Boyd, 1996). 
 
Once the locus of the WS deletion was documented, several others genes started to be 
identified in the critical region. Much excitement was generated by the discovery of 
the deletion of the LIM Kinase-1 gene because it is expressed in the brain. LIMK1 is 
situated telomeric to ELN and was found to be deleted in all patients with a typical 
WS deletion (Frangiskakis, Ewart, Morris, Mervis, Bertrand, Robinson, Klein, 
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Ensing, Everett, Green, Proschel, Cutowski, Noble, Atkinson, Odelberg & Keating, 
1996; Tassabehji, Metcalfe, Fergusson, Carette, Dore, Donnai, Read, Proschel, 
Gutowski, Mao & Sheer, 1996). LIMK1 encodes a protein tyrosine kinase that 
inactivates cofilin, a protein required for the turnover of actin filaments (Arber, 
Barbayannis, Hanser, Schneider, Stanyon, Bernard & Caroni, 1998). Mouse models 
had already shown that during embryogenesis LIMK1 is expressed in the central 
nervous system, including the inner nuclear layer of the retina, the cortex, the spinal 
cord, the cranial nerves and dorsal root ganglia (Proschel, Blouin, Gutowski, Ludwig, 
& Noble, 1995). Thus, mutations in the expression of LIMK1 in Williams syndrome 
are likely to affect axonal guidance during the crucial building of the central nervous 
system (for a review of the genes in the WS critical region, see Franke, 1999). 
 
B. The WS physical phenotype 
Mean birth weight in WS is low, with postnatal growth retardation frequently 
reported. Early puberty also often contributes to the low final adult height (Cherniske, 
Sadler, Schwartz, Carpenter & Pober, 1999). The facial dysmorphology is particularly 
characteristic. Patients have a flat nasal bridge and anteverted nares, a wide mouth 
with fleshy lips, periorbital fullness, flat malar region, small mandible and prominent 
cheeks. Failure to thrive, often due to difficulties in sucking, is reported during early 
infancy. A prematurely aged appearance is often apparent in late adolescence and 
early adulthood. As mentioned, supravalvular aortic stenosis and peripheral 
pulmonary artery stenosis are very common in the syndrome (Hallidie-Smith & 
Karas, 1988), with elevated blood pressure also frequently noted in adolescents and 
adults (Broder, Reinhardt, Ahern, Lifton, Tamborlane & Pober, 1999).  Some 50% of 
children with WS have strabismus, commonly with refractive errors (Atkinson, 
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Anker, Braddick, Nokes,  Mason &  Braddick, 2001; Winter, Pankau, Amm, Gosch & 
Wessel, 1996). Hyeracusis – an unusual hypersensitivity to certain sounds – is present 
in as many as 95% of patients, whereas audiometry is usually normal. Little is yet 
known about central auditory processing in Williams syndrome although new 
research is underway (Cohen, Ansari, Rosen & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). 
 
 
C. The WS behavioural and cognitive phenotypes 
In experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the terms “behavioural” and 
“cognitive” have different meanings from the way in which they are employed in 
clinical medicine. For the clinician, “behavioural phenotype” refers to emotional and 
personality traits, attention deficits, as well as IQ scores. “Cognitive” is simply 
subsumed under the term “behavioural” and refers to the standardised measures of 
intelligence. In experimental psychology, by contrast, “behavioural” refers to 
measures of overt behaviour, e.g., scores relating to whether or not the subject 
succeeds or fails at a task. The “cognitive” level attempts to account for the mental 
processes underlying the overt behaviour, i.e., how the individual processes the inputs 
involved in the task. This is not unsimilar to an early but hitherto rather neglected 
distinction made by Werner (1937) between achievement and process. It must be 
always recalled, therefore, that the same overt behaviour may be achieved by different 
underlying cognitive processes when comparing various disorders to the normal case 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). Thus, claims that certain aspects of a profile are 
“unimpaired”, “intact”, “preserved” and the like, need to be taken with caution until 
the cognitive level has been fully explored. To understand a syndrome in any depth, it 
is vital to distinguish between the behavioural phenotype and the cognitive 
phenotype. 
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The behavioural phenotype in WS includes what has been termed „hypersociability‟ 
(Jones, Bellugi, Lai, Chiles, Reilly, Lincoln & Adolphs, 2000), with a tendency to be 
overly friendly with strangers and to lack social judgement skills (Einfeld, Tonge & 
Florio, 1997; Gosch & Pankau, 1997). People with WS frequently display high 
anxiety about new situations. They are, however, particularly empathetic towards 
others‟ emotions, but far less skilled at understanding human intentionality (Tager-
Flusberg, Boshart & Baron-Cohen, 1998). Most studies estimate a mean full IQ of 
between 51-70 (Bellugi, et al., 1994; Mervis et al., 1999; Udwin & Yule, 1991). To be 
noted, however, is the fact that full IQ scores camouflage marked unevenness in the 
WS profile, with verbal IQ outstripping performance IQ in the majority of cases. The 
pioneering work of Bellugi and her collaborators had originally suggested some clear-
cut dissociations in the cognitive architecture of WS.  Language and face processing 
appeared to be “preserved” alongside both general retardation and particularly serious 
problems with visuo-spatial cognition (Bellugi, et al., 1994). However, as mentioned 
above, the notion that behavioural abilities in a developmental disorder directly index 
underlying cognitive processes is one that we challenge (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; 
Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, in press, a). Indeed, in-depth analyses of the language 
and face processing of WS adults – two areas frequently reported to be “intact”– 
strongly suggest that the behavioural proficiencies of these individuals are supported 
by different cognitive processes compared with normal controls.  
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VI. Neurocomputational constraints on development in Williams  
syndrome 
Having set the stage for understanding the characteristics of our particular experiment 
of nature – Williams syndrome – we can now turn to the issues laid out in our 
introductory sections as to what developmental disorders can tell us about the 
neurocomputational constraints that shape development, using language acquisition as 
our main illustration. The rest of this article will proceed as follows. We begin with a 
consideration of the (static) endstate of language development in WS, including 
claims for selective deficits and dissociations. To emphasise the role that altered-
constraints-on-plasticity must play in WS, we identify the type of acquired damage 
that causes similar patterns of behavioural deficits in normal adults, and then examine 
what happens to normal children who experience such damage early in development. 
As we have seen, in our target disorder the cause is not acquired damage but a genetic 
mutation acting from embryogenesis onwards. Consideration of a realistic causal link 
between (potentially mutated) genes and (potentially altered) behaviour leads us to 
focus on the precursors of language development in WS. It is here that we have the 
best opportunity to reveal the intrinsic neurocomputational constraints that differ in 
the infant with WS, before they are obscured behind layers of development driven by 
dynamic interaction with the environment. A review of the available evidence leads 
us to a hypothesis concerning the constraints that may be atypical in WS language 
(and by implication, that must act appropriately in normal development). Armed with 
these, we offer a developmental theory of the acquisition of language in this disorder 
and how this might enlighten theories of typical development. Finally, we focus on 
how one might explore more precisely the influence of constraints on development 
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within a neurocomputational framework via the application of connectionist 
modelling techniques. 
 
A. Language in late childhood/adulthood in Williams syndrome 
In the initial characterisations of Williams syndrome, it was thought that the seeming 
dissociation between language and other general reasoning abilities might represent 
an informative „experiment of nature‟. Thus, Rossen, Klima, Bellugi, Bihrle & Jones 
(1996) commented that the syndrome „presents a remarkable juxtaposition of 
impaired and intact mental capacities…[..]...linguistic functioning is preserved in 
Williams syndrome while problem solving ability and visuospatial cognition are 
impaired‟. In Pinker‟s initial references to the disorder (1991, 1994), he viewed WS as 
an example of the potential developmental independence of language and cognition, 
consistent with his theory that language (and particularly syntax) is an innate, self-
contained module. Indeed, he contrasted WS with Specific Language Impairment 
(SLI), a disorder that presents as a case of impaired language development with 
apparently normal non-verbal cognition and intelligence. Given that SLI has a 
heritable component, Pinker (1999) argued that WS and SLI together represent a 
„genetic double dissociation‟ pointing to the developmental independence of language 
from cognition. 
 
However, subsequent careful research has led researchers to more refined claims, 
given that a range of studies has revealed anomalies at all levels of language in WS, 
including phonology, lexical-semantics, grammar, and pragmatics. Such studies 
include the examination of WS populations in several countries, such as the USA, 
Britain, Italy, France, Spain, and Germany (see Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, in press, 
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a, for a review of this work). It does appear true that in some cases, individuals with 
WS are competent at understanding and producing a wide range of sophisticated 
grammatical constructions (see, e.g., Clahsen & Almazan, 1998). (It should of course 
be kept in mind that, as in many developmental disorders, there is great individual 
variability in WS. Some lower functioning individuals show much poorer language 
despite having the same genetic deletion.) On the other hand, in almost all cases of 
WS, language performance falls below that found in chronological age-matched 
controls. Indeed, most studies of language in WS now compare performance against 
mental age controls.  Paradoxically, those claiming that language and cognition are 
independent also opt for MA-matched controls; yet this very choice implicitly accepts 
a relationship between language and cognition! And it is worth noting that full IQ 
measures make the language results look more impressive than they really are. To 
state that a 25-year-old adult with WS has a full IQ of 53 but understands complex 
embedded clauses seems impressive. But assessed from a different angle, that of 
Mental Age, it is much less amazing. The same 25-year-old individual with WS may 
have a Verbal Mental Age of 8, but then there is nothing surprising about the fact that 
typically developing 8-year-olds have mastered many complex, structural aspects of 
language (see discussion in Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). It is often the pragmatic 
limitations of WS language that draw listeners‟ attention to the fact that this 
individual‟s conversation is not at the level we expect for a typical 25-year-old, or an 
8-year-old, for that matter. For example, in WS, speech content is often odd or out of 
place in a particular social context (Volterra, Capirci & Caselli, 2001), speech can 
contain high levels of clichés and stereotyped phrases (Howlin, Davies & Udwin, 
1998a), and the comprehending of non-literal language, can be very deficient 
(Howlin, Davies & Udwin, 1998b). 
Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, page 18 
 
Despite a retreat from some of the stronger claims, two aspects of language in WS 
remain notable. First, the language of these individuals is often more advanced than 
that found in other genetic developmental disorders with comparable IQ, such as 
Down’s syndrome (Bellugi, Wang & Jernigan, 1994; Mervis et al., 1999). Second, 
language performance in WS is markedly out of step with their visuo-spatial 
cognition, which is particularly poor and shows a characteristic ‘featural’ style of 
processing (Deruelle, Mancini, Livet, Cassé-Perrot, & de Schonen, 1999; Donnai & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2000). Indeed, one of the defining criteria of the cognitive 
phenotype of WS is the disparity between performance on standardised tests of 
vocabulary and on standardised tests of visuo-spatial construction (such as a copying 
a pattern with a set of coloured blocks, or copying a picture) (Mervis, Robinson, 
Bertrand, Morris, Klein-Tasman, & Armstrong, 2000). 
 
However, claims persist that selective deficits can be found within the language 
systems of individuals with WS, and that such deficits can inform theorists about the 
structure of the normal language system. For instance, Temple and colleagues argue 
that „the linguistic performance of [individuals with] WS can be explained in terms of 
selective deficits to an otherwise normal modular system‟ (Temple & Clahsen, in 
press, italics added), and as a pattern of „some preservation and some disability‟ 
(Temple, Almazan, & Sherwood, 2002). The latter claims for deficits have focused on 
the representation of and access to word-specific knowledge. For instance, the 
language of individuals with WS has frequently been characterised as containing 
unusual or low frequency items (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1994; Pinker, 1991, 1994, 1999; 
Rossen et al., 1996; Temple et al., 2002), and older children with WS have been 
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argued to demonstrate naming deficits and difficulties representing fine semantic 
distinctions (Temple et al., 2002). In the domain of inflectional morphology, it has 
been argued that word inflections involving word-specific knowledge (such as 
irregular past tenses and plurals) are selectively impaired in WS, while those 
following grammatical rules are in line with mental age (Clahsen & Almazan, 1998, 
2001; Pinker, 1991, 1994), but, note, not chronological age. Overall the claim has 
been that grammar is preserved in WS (i.e., develops normally), while some aspects 
of word-knowledge are impaired (i.e., develop atypically). To reiterate, the 
comparison is with mental age, not chronological age, so such claims simply dismiss 
the considerable delay as if delay in one system were completely independent of the 
rest of the developing system.   WS has none the less been used to support the 
position that there is a dissociation between language and cognition and that the 
distinction between grammar and the lexicon is innate (e.g., Pinker, 1999). 
 
There are a number of shortcomings with these arguments, not least the fact that many 
of the empirical findings on which they are based have employed very small numbers 
of participants with WS and that they have often failed to replicate when larger 
samples have been used (e.g., standardised tests of word fluency reveal that WS 
vocabulary is no more atypical than mental age controls: Jarrold, Hartley, Phillips & 
Baddeley, 2000; Scott, Mervis, Bertrand, Klein, Armstrong, & Ford, 1995; there is no 
significant selective deficit for irregular inflections over regular inflections: Thomas, 
Grant, Gsödl, Laing, Barham, Lakusta, Tyler, Grice, Paterson & Karmiloff-Smith, 
2001, and Zukowski, 2001; naming skills are in line with verbal mental age: Thomas, 
Dockrell, Messer, Parmigiani, Ansari & Karmiloff-Smith,  2002). However, the 
selective-deficit claims are illustrative of the view that it is sufficient to explain a 
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developmentally disordered system with reference to a static model of the normal 
adult language system, and to orient an empirical program merely towards identifying 
those components that are deficient – thereby negating altogether the contribution of 
development. 
 
We argue that this appeal to static models has inhibited progress in understanding WS 
in particular and developmental disorders in general, but we do not wish to overstate 
this case. Even in the more static accounts, with their postulation of preserved and 
impaired components, there are occasional hints among researchers that the final 
explanation of anomalies in the WS system must fall within a developmental 
framework. Thus, Pinker comments that „presumably LIM-kinase1 [deleted from one 
copy of chromosome 7 in WS] plays an important role in the development of the 
neural networks used in spatial reasoning, possibly in the parietal lobes. The other 
missing genes, perhaps, are necessary for the development of other parts and 
processes of the brain, though not for language‟ (1999, p.260-1, italics added). When 
Rossen et al. (1996) appealed to a static model of the WS lexicon to explain the 
presence of unusual words in WS vocabulary, they sought to characterise the problem 
as a specific anomaly of activation dynamics against a background of normal lexical 
structure: „… While individuals with WS have well organised semantic categories, 
and have good access to word knowledge, an anomaly does exist in some tasks 
dependent on consideration of words in a complex activation environment‟. Yet in the 
same article, when these researchers began to consider the impact of development on 
the disorder, they added that, so long as activation dynamics were involved in 
knowledge acquisition, knowledge could not be normal while activation dynamics 
were anomalous: „Contemporary neural models of learning postulate definable 
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quantitative relationships bridging the classical dichotomy of structure and process… 
Within this model paradigm, if activity malfunction with the lexicon exists, then 
abnormality of lexicon structure will likely follow‟ (Rossen et al., 1996). 
 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of theories of the “preserved/impaired” kind provides an 
opportunity to stress our alternative claim that genetic developmental disorders are 
best viewed as altered constraints on plasticity. To make this argument, we first 
consider what type of brain damage might underlie the types of selective deficits 
proposed, were they to appear in a normal adult.  We then turn to the literature on the 
developmental outcomes of these types of brain damage when they occur in typically 
developing young children, in whom we assume that normal constraints on plasticity 
hold. 
 
The clearest parallels between behavioural deficits in WS and those found in normal 
adults with acquired brain damage have been made in the domain of word inflections 
(e.g., past tense of verbs, plurals of nouns, comparatives of adjectives). Thus Pinker 
(1991, 1994) has explicitly argued that the deficits in inflectional morphology found 
in WS are similar to those occurring in fluent aphasia in normal adults, following 
damage to left temporal areas. These patients also show difficulties in word retrieval. 
Similar parallels are drawn with deficits displayed in neurodegenerative disorders, 
such as Alzheimer‟s disease and cases of semantic dementia. These disorders are also 
characterised by acquired functional damage that is greater in the temporal areas and 
adjacent parietal areas than in the frontal lobes. And for reference, as the earlier 
quoation from Pinker implies, visuo-spatial constructive deficits are found in normal 
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adults following damage to parietal areas, and in particular, the featural style of 
processing tends to be associated with right parietal damage. 
 
Note, however, that individuals with WS do not suddenly suffer discrete brain damage 
in adulthood, but have anomalies in brain structures from the start of brain 
development. What happens if these types of focal brain damage – to left temporal 
areas, or to right parietal areas – occur to normal individuals early in infancy? 
Another set of nature‟s experiments can provide the answer. 
 
B. Evidence for atypical constraints on plasticity in Williams syndrome 
Bates and Roe (2001) recently reviewed the evidence concerning the effects of early 
unilateral brain damage on the language development of young children, including the 
effect of lesion side (left or right hemisphere) and lesion site. There were three main 
findings. First, almost all the brain injured children exhibited delays in first-word 
production, regardless of lesion side or site. Bates and Roe interpret these data as 
suggesting that it is hard to get language “off the ground” after significant damage to 
either hemisphere. Second, delays in word production tended to be more severe in 
children with left posterior damage, particularly in the temporal lobe. Bates and Roe 
note the apparently greater importance of the left hemisphere, but interestingly the 
fact that in the adult, it is left frontal not temporal posterior damage that is associated 
with expressive language deficits. Third, and most relevant to our concerns, is the fact 
that the evidence suggests that when damage occurs prior to around 5 to 7 years of 
age, plastic reorganisation takes place such that when tested later, these children show 
little if any language impairment. Importantly, there are no broad effects of side of 
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damage. In short, early damage to left (or right) hemisphere when there is normal 
plasticity tends to lead to recovery, with no long-lasting gross deficits. 
 
The implication is that the analogies drawn between behavioural deficits after focal 
lesions in normal adults and behavioural deficits in individuals with WS do not point 
to a common underlying cause. Where focal damage occurs in early childhood, 
normal plasticity is sufficient to effect behavioural recovery as a result of ontogenetic 
development.  If we rule out focal damage + normal plasticity as an explanation for 
WS, then several options remain. There could be widespread damage + normal 
plasticity, focal damage + atypical plasticity, or widespread damage + atypical 
plasticity. Of these options, increasing evidence suggests that the brains of individuals 
with WS do not present with focal lesions (and this is also the case for almost all other 
genetic developmental disorders), but with widespread differences in neuroanatomical 
features (Bellugi, Wang & Jernigan, 1994), in neuronal density (Galaburda, Wang, 
Bellugi & Rossen, 1994), in biochemistry (Rae et al., 1998), and in 
electrophysiological activity (Grice et al., 2001; Neville, Mills & Bellugi, 1994). 
  
The possibility that WS is caused by widespread but subtle damage + normal 
plasticity merits consideration. Rourke (e.g., 1987, 1989) proposed the notion of non-
verbal learning disability to account for a consistent pattern of behavioural deficits 
observed in children with a history of early, generalised cerebral deficits. Anderson, 
Northam, Hendy and Wrennall (2001) summarise the main features as follows: 
bilateral tactile-perceptual deficits, more marked on the left side of the body, impaired 
visual recognition and discrimination, impaired visuospatial organisation, bilateral 
psychomotor coordination problems, again more marked on the left side of the body, 
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and difficulties managing novel information. Among these weaknesses are also areas 
of relative strength, which include simple motor skills, auditory perception, rote 
learning, selective and sustained attention for auditory-verbal information, basic 
expressive and receptive language, and word reading and spelling. Non-verbal 
learning disorder bears a number of similarities to the features of WS, in particular the 
relative strength of language compared to the deficits in visuospatial skills. Indeed, 
within language itself, Rourke and Tsatsanis (1996) point to a dissociation between 
better performance on structural aspects of language than on pragmatics, another 
similarity with WS. However, differential perceptual and motor problems with the left 
side of the body have never hitherto been reported in WS.  
 
Rourke‟s notion of non-verbal learning disability (NVLD) is interesting here in that it 
is allied to an underlying neurological explanation called the „white matter 
hypothesis‟ (Rourke, 1987; see Anderson et al., 2001, for discussion). The idea is that 
the global connectivity of the brain, the white matter, has a prolonged period of 
development, in which it is particularly vulnerable to disruption after widespread 
damage in children who have experienced conditions such as traumatic brain injury, 
cranial irradiation to treat tumours, or hydrocephalus. (Note that under some 
circumstances, these conditions may be associated with a normal genotype, such that 
one might expect normal plasticity if the mechanisms that support it have survived.) 
Rourke then distinguishes between the roles of white matter in the left and right 
hemispheres. In the right hemisphere, he proposes that white matter is important for 
both development and maintenance of skills (including global integration of 
information), while in the left hemisphere it is important for the development of skills 
but not necessarily their maintenance. In this view, the right hemisphere is responsible 
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for more integrative functions and the left hemisphere for more segregated functions. 
Widespread damage to the white matter then results in greater impairments to the 
functions of the right hemisphere (such as visuo-spatial integration and pragmatic 
aspects of language), than to the more self-contained functions of the left hemisphere, 
(such as processing of visual detail, auditory processing, basic expressive and 
productive language). 
 
It is an appealing notion that that widespread damage can itself result in differential 
(seemingly selective) effects on the functions of left and right hemisphere, which 
normal plasticity is unable to overcome during atypical development (due to the 
severity of the damage), for this would explain the subsequent uneven profile of 
cognitive abilities. However, it is far from clear than NVLD is a homogeneous 
syndrome – indeed, Rourke (1987) prefers to conceptualise it as a „final common 
pathway‟ of deficits that may be caused by a range of underlying pathologies. A range 
of disorders, including both those of genetic origin and of acquired early damage, are 
subsumed under this heading, each of which shares different levels of similarity to the 
prototypical description of the disorder. As such, NVLD may be a label attached to 
the common behavioural deficits shared by very sub-optimal cognitive systems, 
systems which differ as to their underlying causes and which, at a detailed level, differ 
in their cognitive symptoms. Gross behavioural deficits in the more challenging, 
integrative aspects of cognition may then be reached either by a system with normal 
plasticity but widespread damage (if indeed the mechanisms of normal plasticity 
remain after such damage), or by a system with both widespread anomalies and 
atypical plasticity. It is the latter possibility that we would argue obtains in the case of 
genetic developmental disorders such as WS, for reasons that we address in the next 
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section. Nevertheless, despite the common tendency to seek dissociations, the 
behavioural similarities across genetic syndromes can also be very informative 
(Bishop, 1997; Karmiloff-Smith, 1997, 1998). Given the complex and indirect 
relationship between genes and brain development, it remains possible that different 
genes have similar distal effects on brain development and lead to similar cognitive 
deficits. Indeed, such a possibility has been explicitly raised regarding similarities 
identified between WS and velocardiofacial / DiGeorge syndrome (Beardon, Wang, & 
Simon, 2002), although this initial comparison has yet to be established in depth. 
 
C. A causal model for exploring the relationship between genes and 
behaviour 
We have argued that the effects of a genetic mutation that emerge during 
embryogenesis and postnatal brain growth are likely to be widespread across the 
developing system, albeit relatively subtle, but that a consequence of the mutation can 
be the emergence of an uneven cognitive profile in the endstate. In trying to link the 
genetic mutation to the final behavioural profile, it is important to have a realistic 
causal model in mind that could, however indirectly, connect the two. 
 
Despite the fact that in recent times (and often, admittedly, in the popular press), 
genes have been specifically linked to behaviours (such as the “gene for language”, 
the “gene for crime”, the “gene for homosexuality”, and so forth), the link between 
genes and adult behaviour is of course incredibly indirect and involves many-to-many 
rather than one-to-one mappings between genes and behavioural phenotypes. 
Moreover, genetic mutations are limited in the ways in which they can disrupt brain 
development. Pennington (2001) suggests three broad classes of effects, those on (1) 
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brain size, in terms of altering the number of neurons or synapses, (2) neuronal 
migration, sometimes in a regionally specific fashion, and (3) neurotransmission, 
either by changing levels of neurotransmitter or changing the binding properties of 
receptor proteins. To this we would add the fact that genetic mutations can also affect 
the timing of gene expression which will have cascading effects on the developing 
organism, since timing is a crucial aspect of the emergent organisation of the 
functional structure (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi & Plunkett, 
1996; Huttenlocher, 2002; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, 1998). Importantly, these effects 
impact on the neurocomputational properties of the brain, including the way in which 
it modifies its structure as a consequence of internally- or externally-generated 
activity. Subsequent behavioural deficits are the outcome of a long trajectory of 
development, whereby cognitive structures emerge via an interaction between internal 
neurocomputational constraints and the environment. 
 
In placing development itself as a vital factor in the explanation of developmental 
disorders (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998), we have characterised the developmental 
emergence of cognitive structures as a type of recursive equation (Thomas & 
Karmiloff-Smith, in press, a). The equation is as follows: More complex cognitive 
structure = Less complex structure X process of development. This means that the 
process of development corresponds to the interaction of an internal or external 
environment with the existing neurocomputational constraints
1
.  
 
In atypical development, the neurocomputational constraints can differ. Under these 
conditions, each cycle of recursion that operates on a system may produce functional 
properties that fall inside or outside the normal range, and for any subsequent steps of 
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development that rely on this system, a new set of constraints that are more or less 
atypical for the next pass through the equation. The result is that across the whole 
developing cognitive system, there emerges a complex, graded pattern of areas that 
function either within or outside the range of variation that one might expect in the 
normal population. (In cognitive terms, these graded variations are with respect to the 
functional properties of sub-systems rather than their purely anatomical or 
physiological properties). Whether a given subsystem falls inside or outside the 
normal functional range as a consequence of the operation of the equation depends on 
the extent to which the development of that subsystem relies upon the particular 
neurocomputational constraints that were the atypical outcome of the previous 
operation of the equation
2
. Ultimately, this cascade of equations emanates from the 
gene products that were altered in embryogenesis by the original genetic mutation.  
 
This is a complex formulation, but we believe it is a more realistic causal pathway 
than that offered by static theories calling on preserved/impaired modules, because it 
includes development at every stage. Importantly, as a causal model, it seeks to 
remain at a single (in this case, cognitive) level of description. Causal relations 
cannot, in our view, operate across levels of description. That is, neuronal activations 
do not cause mental representations, they are mental representations. Genes cause 
molecular events. Thus genes are not only separated from behaviour by a long and 
complex developmental trajectory, but also by existing at a different, lower level of 
description. 
 
Having taken this point on board, we are presented with a problem. If, to identify the 
causal origins of cognitive deficits, we must remain at the cognitive level of 
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description, then we are faced with the difficulty that the foetus and newborn infant 
do not have cognition in the way that children or adults do. To construct the causal 
account, we must therefore describe a proto-cognitive system in the newborn or infant 
that produces behavioural precursors to later complex behaviours that we see in 
children and adults (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). With development, mental 
representations begin at a simple, concrete level and achieve an increase in 
abstractness and complexity following operation of the recursive equation we have 
proposed. Now, some might describe more complex/abstract cognitive processes as 
“higher-level” functions, and in this sense, the equation recursively climbs from lower 
to higher levels of representation across development. But crucially, the distinction 
between low-level and high-level representations is one of complexity and 
abstractness, while the causal relations remain at the same cognitive level of 
description. (Of course, different disciplines will seek to characterise this recursive 
causal equation at other levels of description, such as at the level of neural structure 
when characterising the emergence of atypical brain structures).  
 
We have taken a short diversion from WS to make this conceptual clarification, but 
the outcome is a clear message of methodology. If we are to tease apart the cascade of 
developmental equations that has led to cognitive deficits in the adult state, we must 
pursue those deficits back down the cascade, to their origins in infancy (Brown, 
Johnson, Paterson, Gilmore, Longhi, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998; Paterson, Brown, Gsödl, Johnson & Karmiloff-Smith, 1999). In studying 
cognitive precursors of complex behaviours, we will find the clearest evidence of the 
altered neurocomputational constraints that are the first cognitive consequence of a 
genetic mutation. 
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D. Atypical precursors to language in Williams syndrome 
The most salient aspect of the onset of language in WS is that it is delayed. Although 
this delay is variable, one study of 54 children with WS found an average delay of 2 
years, similar to that found for children with Down syndrome (DS) (Singer Harris, 
Bellugi, Bates, Jones & Rossen, 1997; see also Paterson et al., 1999). Though 
delayed, some aspects of early development reveal normal behavioural patterns. For 
example, the onset of hand banging predicts the onset of canonical babbling in infants 
with WS in the same way as it does in typically developing infants (Masataka, 2001; 
Mervis & Bertrand, 1997). And, once language development commences, the 
relationship between vocabulary size and grammatical complexity, although seriously 
delayed, is again within the normal range, a pattern that contrasts with DS where 
grammatical complexity is reduced for a given vocabulary level (Singer Harris et al., 
1997). 
 
Despite the fact that phonological memory appears as a relative strength in WS in 
childhood and adulthood (Mervis et al., 1999), a study of the ability of infants and 
toddlers with WS to segment fluent speech stream into words revealed serious delays 
(Nazzi, Paterson, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003). In part, then, language delays may be 
due to problems with the early development of speech perception and phonological 
representations. 
 
However, some precursors appear not just delayed, but atypical. For example, Laing 
and colleagues examined socio-interactive precursors to language development in 
toddlers with WS compared with MA controls (Laing, Butterworth, Ansari, Gsödl, 
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Longhi, Panagiotaki, Paterson & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). Although toddlers with WS 
were proficient at dyadic interactions with a caregiver (and indeed sometimes 
exceeded the scores of MA controls due to persistent fixation on the caregiver‟s face; 
see also Bertrand, Mervis, Rice & Adamson, 1993; Jones et al., 2000), there was a 
marked deficiency in triadic interactions incorporating an object. Specifically, 
toddlers with WS had difficulty switching attention from the caregiver to an object 
that was being referred to in communication (via pointing, looking, and naming). One 
might imagine that this deficiency would disadvantage the toddlers with WS in 
learning the names of objects, since shared attention to newly named objects appears 
one of the main routes into vocabulary acquisition. And indeed, there is accumulating 
evidence that precursors to vocabulary development in WS are atypical. 
 
Typically developing infants use the presence of linguistic or gestural information 
accompanying the introduction of novel objects to influence their subsequent 
categorisation of those objects, sometimes over and above the perceptual similarities 
among the objects. However, Nazzi and Karmiloff-Smith (2002) found that 2-6 year 
old children with WS were significantly less able than typical controls to use verbal 
cues to constrain categorisation. Masataka (2000) found a similar poverty in the 
ability of 2-3 year olds with WS to use gestural information to constrain 
categorisation.  
 
In typically developing children, the ability to use pointing to refer to objects tends to 
emerge before the use of verbal labels for the same purpose. Presumably, pointing 
indexes the emergence of the cognitive ability to make reference, prior to the lexical 
manifestation. Pointing to objects and eliciting pointing behaviour in adults also 
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facilitate the ability to find the correct referent for a given label. However, in WS, 
Mervis and Bertrand (1997) found that the order was reversed, with the onset of 
productive vocabulary preceding pointing. Laing et al. (2002) confirmed a deficit in 
the pointing behaviour of infants with WS, despite relative proficiency at fine motor 
skills. Vocabulary acquisition, therefore, appears to rely on a different set of cues and 
constraints in WS. When Stevens and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) examined the 
constraints that older children and young adults with WS were using to learn labels 
for novel words, these, too, appeared atypical. 
 
It is often the case that WS seems to present with a mixture of typical and atypical 
patterns within the same domain.  For example, Mervis and Bertrand (1997) found 
that when playing with toys, non-verbal play patterns and object label comprehension 
patterns in children with WS showed the normal priority of basic level categories over 
subordinate categories, a pattern also found in DS. However, relations between 
markers of semantic knowledge and productive vocabulary appeared yet again 
atypical in the WS group. For instance, spontaneous exhaustive sorting of objects 
(such as arranging toy animals and blocks into their separate categories) indexes the 
development of semantic knowledge, and tends to precede a rapid rise in the rate of 
vocabulary acquisition in typically developing children. Thus, by the time children 
find it clear which categories objects fall into, it becomes increasingly easier for them 
to attach consistent labels to different objects. However, for children with WS, Mervis 
and Bertrand (1997) found no evidence that exhaustive sorting preceded the 
vocabulary spurt; indeed, several children with WS exhibited the reverse pattern 
(unlike children with DS, who displayed the normal pattern).  
 
Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, page 33 
Finally, anecdotal parental reports have suggested that young children with WS 
sometimes appear to say more than they actually comprehend (Singer Harris et al., 
1997). Consistent with this, there is some systematic evidence that compared to 
normal children, the vocabulary of young children with WS exhibits a reduced 
advantage for comprehension vocabulary over production vocabulary (Paterson, 
2000), implying a relatively higher productive vocabulary for their level for 
comprehension. 
 
In summary, precursors to language development in WS paint a picture with two main 
themes. First there is an overall delay, perhaps of a more generalised nature 
incorporating delays in at least motor, phonological, and semantic development. 
Second, when language development gets underway, a differential balance emerges 
between the ability to encode and produce word forms on the one hand, and the 
acquisition of the semantic underpinnings for those words on the other. 
 
E. A developmental framework for language acquisition in Williams 
syndrome 
The psychological literature on the language of older children, adolescents, and adults 
with WS is more substantial, but two types of hypothesis can be identified within it 
(Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, in press, a). The first hypothesis is a conservative one, 
that the language of individuals with WS is broadly in line with their overall learning 
disabilities. From this perspective, some anomalies arise as an indirect effect of their 
other deficits, such as the visuo-spatial deficit which causes a difficulty with acquiring 
prepositions that encode spatial relations (Jarrold, Phillips, Baddeley, Grant & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2001). Interestingly, the data also point to a general problem in WS 
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with relational terms like “darker than” that are non-spatial and yet involve the need 
to generate spatialized internal mental representations to process them. However, 
although this may explain local difficulties in some aspects of WS language, such a 
conservative hypothesis fails of course to account for why language development 
should be better in WS than in other disorders with comparable IQ, such as DS. 
 
The second hypothesis is the more prevalent and, in line with the conclusions of the 
preceding section, views language in WS as evolving according to an atypical balance 
of constraints from phonology and semantics. As yet, there is no consensus on 
whether the differential balance is caused simply by a relative strength in phonology, 
simply by a relative weakness in semantics, by a difficulty in integrating these two 
sources of information, or some combination of these possibilities. Nevertheless, there 
is now sufficient evidence to begin to sketch out a developmental theory of language 
acquisition in WS, a theory that stands in marked contrast to accounts that have dealt 
purely in terms of selective deficits to a static model of the normal system. We have 
constructed this preliminary account in the context of our recent work exploring the 
causes of the unusual, socially-engaging vocabulary in the language of individuals 
with WS (Thomas et al., 2002). This phenomenon is one of its most widely reported 
characteristics, and a finding that led to the claims about isolated deficits in word-
specific knowledge that we discussed in a previous section. 
 
In our preliminary account, language in WS is seen in a wider socio-communicative 
context, and in a developmental framework that takes into consideration the way in which 
compensation can occur in a system that has different initial processing biases but can be 
adapted to meet the social needs of the individual. From this perspective, the unusual 
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characteristics of conversation in WS reflect a form of developmental compensation in 
which language is used primarily to meet the (possibly heightened) social needs of the 
individual (Jones et al., 2000), but acquisition is restricted by a difficulty in extracting the 
exact sense and context in which vocabulary items are being used by speaker. Indeed, the 
final semantic and conceptual representations formed in individuals with WS may well be 
shallower, with less abstract information and more perceptually-based detail, suggested by 
work examining conceptual knowledge in WS (Johnson & Carey, 1998), as well as by 
work on the development of semantic categories and metaphor comprehension (Thomas, 
van Duuren, Ansari, Parmigiani, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). However, language 
development in WS is bolstered by a relative strength in phonological processing that 
permits the encoding and production of a range of words. This form of compensation is 
evidenced indirectly by basic measures of nonword repetition (Mervis et al., 1999), but 
also directly by analyses suggesting that the contribution of phonology to word learning 
compared to that of the existing lexicon may be greater in WS than is typical after 5 years 
of age (Grant, Karmiloff-Smith, Gathercole, Paterson, Howlin, Davies & Udwin, 1997), 
and from word learning tasks suggesting preferential use of phonological over semantic 
information (Laing, Hulme, Grant, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2001). The outcome in WS is a 
language system that is preferentially geared towards engaging and maintaining social 
interaction, and that uses well-formed socially effective vocabulary and phrases with only 
approximate semantic underpinnings. Unusual vocabulary in WS is successful in engaging 
interest, but closer inspection suggests that it is not supported by appropriate contextual 
nuances of meaning (Rossen et al., 1996). 
 
In our view, this sketch emphasises paradigmatic characteristics of the way in which to 
explore the origin of cognitive deficits in developmental disorders: explore developmental 
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precursors in infancy, build these into a dynamic account which incorporates both the 
social environment of the individual and the capacity for compensation, given the altered 
constraints acting on development. Against this type of account, we have contrasted an 
approach to language in WS that only references a static model of the normal system and 
claims a dissociation between „preserved‟ syntactic knowledge and „impaired‟ word-
specific knowledge (Clashen & Almazan, 1998). In fact, we believe that currently there is 
no strong support for a grammar-lexicon dissociation in WS, nor indeed a theoretical 
consensus amongst linguists or psychologists that this type of dissociation would be 
developmentally plausible, given the dynamic and constant interactions between these two 
aspects of language during normal acquisition. Thus, while processing in the WS lexicon 
appears inefficient, so too does the processing of syntax in WS (as evidenced by 
exaggerated patterns of difficulty in WS in sentence processing tasks; see Grant, Valian, & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2002; Zukowski, 2001; and Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, in press a, 
Thomas et al., 2001, for discussion). The most salient and agreed upon dissociation within 
the WS cognitive system remains the one first identified by Bellugi and colleagues, of an 
imbalance between some aspects of language (such as vocabulary) and visuo-spatial 
processing (see WS Cognitive Profile: Mervis, et al., 1999). And even here, evidence of 
impairments in spatial vocabulary and spatial representations in WS (Jarrold et al., 2001) 
suggests that this dissociation is not static but has implications when spatial and language 
systems interact across developmental time. 
 
F. Computational approaches 
If links are to be made between genotype and phenotype in developmental disorders, 
we have argued that researchers must identify atypical neurocomputational constraints 
on plasticity that shape from infancy onwards subsequent trajectories of cognitive 
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development. The preceding two sections have presented psychological evidence 
pointing towards the types of constraints that may be atypical in WS language 
development. However, notions like phonology and semantics are some way from the 
neurocomputational characteristics that may have been altered by early 
neurobiological events and subsequent developmental cascades from embryogenesis 
onwards. In order to build links between the psychological cognitive level of 
description and the neural level, it is essential, in our view, to explore the intermediate 
level of computational learning systems (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Such learning 
systems permit us to build models that encode information at the conceptual level 
(e.g., word forms and meanings) – thereby making contact with the psychological 
data – but also for those classes of models that share neurocomputational principles 
with the underlying substrate, to make contact with the neural level as well. 
Connectionist networks are an example of this type of modelling and particularly well 
suited to exploring developmental questions (Elman et al., 1996; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992). We would argue that without computational modelling to link the cognitive 
and neural levels, researchers are left without a concrete idea of what a 
„developmental process‟ might constitute, and what implications it might have in 
producing or recovering from deficits. It is one thing to stress the importance of 
development in understanding developmental disorders. It is another to begin to 
address precisely what the developmental process involves. 
 
Connectionist models have been applied to several developmental disorders, including 
WS, SLI, autism, developmental dyslexia, and schizophrenia. In these cases, the 
researcher starts with a model formulated to capture the normal trajectory of 
development in a given cognitive domain. Over the last fifteen years, connectionist 
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models have been applied to many phenomena within normal cognitive development, 
including those in infancy (e.g., categorisation, object-directed behaviour, memory), 
in childhood (e.g., Piagetian reasoning tasks such as the balance scale problem, 
seriation, and conservation), and in language development (e.g., categorisation of 
speech sounds, segmentation of the speech stream into words, vocabulary 
development, inflectional morphology, syntax,  metaphor, reading). In these models, 
it is possible to identify the computational constraints that guide the normal trajectory 
of development, such as the architecture of the connectionist network, the activation 
dynamics of the system, its input and output representations and its learning rule 
(Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, in press; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002, in press, a, 
b, c).  Either psychological or neuroscientific data are then used to motivate 
alterations to these initial constraints in an attempt to capture the atypical trajectory of 
development observed in a particular disorder, and any endstate deficits in the adult. 
 
To the intermediate level of computational modelling, one may import downwards 
constraints from the psychological level, such as the differences found in 
phonological and semantic representations of individuals with in WS (Thomas & 
Karmiloff-Smith, in press-a), or in the phonological representations of individuals 
with SLI or developmental dyslexia (e.g., Harm & Seidenberg, 1999; Hoeffner & 
McClelland, 1993). Or one may import upwards constraints from the neural level, 
such as the differences in neuronal density observed in different areas of the brains of 
individuals with autism (Cohen, 1998), or differences in the level of dopamine in the 
frontal lobes of individuals with schizophrenia (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992). 
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One of the advantages of computational models is that they allow candidate 
explanations of the developmental process to be explicitly formulated, and for the 
process to be examined under a range of controlled conditions beyond the scope of 
current empirical methods. For example, in one set of simulations (Thomas & 
Karmiloff-Smith, in press-b), we compared the effect of the same type of damage 
applied to a developmental system either prior to training (to represent the case of a 
developmental disorder) or following training (to represent the case of an adult 
acquired disorder). This comparison allowed us to assess the contribution of the 
developmental process (here a learning rule driving the acquisition of a representative 
cognitive domain) in producing patterns of deficits in the final trained state following 
various different types of damage. The results revealed a complicated relationship 
between patterns of deficits following startstate damage and patterns of deficits 
following endstate damage. For certain types of damage (e.g., lesioning), the system 
was far more sensitive to damage in the endstate than the startstate – development 
served to attenuate the effects of differences in the processing structures. For other 
types of damage (e.g., processing noise), the system was far more sensitive to damage 
in the startstate than the endstate – development served to exaggerate the effects of 
differences in the activation dynamics because in the endstate representations were 
already more stable. In some cases, the effects of damage were global (noise, 
lesioning), but in other cases the deficit was selective to particular aspects of the 
cognitive domain only following damage to the endstate. To the extent these networks 
serve as valid models of development, the results emphasise the importance of the 
developmental process in determining the patterns of endstate deficits following 
alteration to different initial neurocomputational constraints. 
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In another set of simulations (Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, in press-b), we examined a 
developmental system which produced emergent specialisation of particular functions 
to particular structures during development. This model allowed us to explore the 
conditions under which static explanations of developmental disorders might hold. 
That is, if modules are an outcome of development, and one part of the system is 
damaged prior to training, does the rest of the system nevertheless develop normally? 
Such a condition (which we term residual normality) must hold if strong analogies are 
to be drawn between selective cognitive deficits in developmental disorders and those 
found in cases of adult damage to previously normally developed brains. Our 
simulations revealed that the conditions under which residual normality would hold 
are fairly narrow, and in many cases developmentally implausible. A developmental 
system suffering initial, selective damage tends to use its remaining resources to 
compensate for the initial damage across development. Our computational work 
therefore supports the conclusions of Section VI B, where we established that in many 
cases, focal brain damage in young healthy children is followed by recovery. 
 
Computational models can also be applied to particular disorders and specific sets of 
empirical data. This type of work allows us to evaluate whether particular theoretical 
claims are actually sufficient to explain the behavioural deficits observed in a given 
developmental disorder. Thus in separate work (Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, in press-
a), we have explored how a connectionist model of normal development of 
inflectional morphology (the English past tense) may be applied to the case of WS. 
This type of a model attempts to maximise the psychological plausibility of its 
constraints, and fit actual patterns of empirical data, from typically developing 
children when the constraints are normal and from the target disorder when the 
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constraints have been altered from the outset in line with the available empirical 
evidence.  
 
In WS, the evidence on the acquisition of past tense formation initially indicated 
difficulty with producing irregular inflections (e.g., think-thought, give-gave) 
(Clahsen & Almazan, 1998). However, these preliminary findings have been hard to 
replicate, and larger studies have suggested that there exist both problems generalising 
inflectional regularities to novel word forms (wug-wugged), and a differential 
influence of lexical semantics on inflection in WS (typically developing children 
found irregular verbs with more abstract meanings harder to inflect than those with 
more concrete meanings, but children and adults with WS performed equally on both) 
(Thomas et al., 2001). 
 
In using a computational model to explore this aspect of language acquisition in WS, 
we pursued the hypotheses discussed in the previous two sections. We explored 
whether manipulations to the initial phonological and semantic representations within 
the normal model were sufficient to shift its developmental performance from that of 
typically developing children to that of our WS cohort. The results showed that 
insufficiently abstract phonological representations (i.e., with reduced redundancy and 
between phoneme similarity) were able to capture the problems in inflecting novel 
forms, and that weakened semantic representations were able to capture poor 
development of irregular inflection, as well as empirical evidence for differential 
influence of semantic variables such as abstractness of verb meaning. Importantly, 
this model demonstrated that to capture the full range of individual variation in the 
empirical data for individuals with WS, multiple initial neurocomputational 
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constraints had to be altered – but that when more than one constraint was altered, the 
effects on the subsequent developmental trajectory tended to be interactive rather than 
additive. For example, weaker semantic constraints tended to exaggerate the effects of 
changes to the phonological constraints. 
 
Although models such as these necessarily contain simplifications (the hallmark of 
any modelling process), we believe that they represent one of the vital ways forward 
in evaluating developmental deficits with a very concrete notion of the developmental 
process in mind. Thus, while our model demonstrated deficits at the end of its 
development that matched patterns found in adults with WS, crucially those deficits 
were the outcome of differential initial computational constraints and the subsequent 
process of development, and did not correspond to the simple removal of any pre-
existing static structures. 
 
VII. Conclusion: Contribution to Developmental Theory of the Study of 
Language in WS - a Natural Experiment of Nature. 
Consistent functional structure appears to emerge in the cognitive systems of normal 
adults, and there has long been a debate about the origin of this consistency. At one 
extreme, there have been theories of pre-wired, innate modular structure, while at the 
other there have been theories of equipotentiality and structure derived from 
regularities in the environmental input. Recently, developmental cognitive 
neuroscience has moved towards a middle way, the idea of emergentism, whereby 
initial constraints in computational properties in the brain „seed‟ specialisation that 
emerges as a product of development (Elman, et al., 1996; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, 
1998; see Thomas, in press, for discussion). However, revealing the nature of these 
Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, page 43 
constraints is complex, since normal development confounds the consistency of these 
constraints across the population with the consistency of the environment to which 
most individuals are exposed. It is thus developmental disorders that may provide a 
window on these constraints, since they represent a situation where the constraints 
start out differently, and where cognitive-level deficits may be the eventual outcome 
of development rather than the initial state. 
 
In the case of genetic developmental disorders with uneven cognitive profiles in their 
outcome, we have started to begin to explore more specific links between genotype 
and phenotype via case study comparisons (Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, Ewing, Carette, 
Metcalfe, Donnai, Read & Tassbehji, 2003). Yet, in our view, progress cannot be 
made if researchers continue to characterise deficits within static models, based on 
behavioural data from older children and adults (Frangiskakis et al., 1996).  This is 
because the behavioural deficits that arise from genetic mutations must be traced back 
to their infant origins and to the cognitive level of account, with development as a 
crucial component of the link (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; Karmiloff-Smith, Scerif & 
Ansari, 2003).  
 
In this paper, we have illustrated this argument with reference to one disorder, 
Williams syndrome. We have detailed the genotype, as well as the physical 
phenotype, and cognitive phenotype. Then, concentrating on the domain of language 
development, we have shown how static accounts of deficits need to be replaced by 
developmental accounts. To do so, we have explored similarities to, and differences 
from, deficits found in cases of child and adult acquired brain damage. A realistic 
causal model of the link between genes and behaviour led us to examine a range of 
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atypical precursors to language development in WS, and then to construct a 
preliminary developmental account of WS language acquisition. Finally, we stressed 
the utility of computational modelling for linking cognitive and neural levels in the 
study of developmental disorders, and for evaluating concrete formulisations of the 
developmental process. 
 
In conclusion, we believe that we have demonstrated that developmental disorders can 
be highly effective experiments of nature, provided the very process of development 
itself remains at the heart of the explanation. 
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1
 We thank our colleague, Julia Grant, for drawing our attention to the fact that our original + sign 
implied an additive notion whereas we had in mind a multiplicative notion. In fact, more precisely the 
equation should read f(x, y, z) where x is the initial existing neurocomputational state, y defines the 
way it changes in response to activity, and z is the internal/external environment. But the equation used 
above is more self explanatory. 
 
 
2
 Whether the subsystem falls inside or outside the normal range of function is a dichotomy enforced 
by measurement on a standardised test. Further, more subtle measures are required to establish the 
degree to which functional structure actually falls within the normal range of variation. 
 
 
